However, people are not especially good at moral reasoning. Reason is too broad Section 6 Morality and Reason Philosophers from Plato to the present day have sought for a ground for ethics that would serve as a basis for morality. Arguments against demonstrative and probable reasoning. Reason’s (logical) analysis of morality reduces it — perhaps to the observer’s surprise to nature, selfishness, and egoism. She convincingly establishes that anyone who thought these passages in Hume are straightforward or easy to interpret is misguided. Read 2 reviews from the world's largest community for readers. A good conscience makes judgments that conform to reason and the good that is willed by the Wisdom of God. A good conscience requires lifelong formation. In nature, the mind discovers general and omnipresent causality. Reason is too broad: errors in morality are unlike errors of reason. Hence, morality cannot be a matter of reason (95). Moral reasoning typically applies logic and moral theories, such as deontology or utilitarianism, to specific situations or dilemmas. The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason book. But at one point in your book, Moral Tribes, you effectively debunk the work of one of the most iconic proponents of reason, Immanuel Kant. Psychologists and neuroscientists like Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene have used hypothetical moral dilemmas like this one to study some of the unconscious processes that go into moral decision-making. Reason and impartiality are considered as minimum requirement for morality.Moral truths are truths of reason; that is, a moral judgment is true if it is espoused by better reasons than the alternatives. Botros' book is a careful, systematic analysis of 3.1.1. Indeed, the term moral dumbfounding describes the fact that people often reach strong moral conclusions that they cannot logically defend. Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality is a major work in this ongoing enterprise. Most of us would say “yes” to the first question and “no” to the second, even though there is the same “body count” involved. Much of the rebuttal parallels the refutation of the knowledge-of-interests argument; i.e., it is self-contradictory to contend that people cannot be trusted to make moral decisions in their daily lives but can be trusted to vote for or accept leaders who are morally wiser than they. Genuine value judgments ought to be backed up by pertinent reasons. Moral choices confront us with the decision to follow or depart from reason and the divine law. Reason, as the moral rationalists construe it, could not on pain of absurdity play any part in motivation. The first involve repeating charges made in Book 2; the notes for that day’s class cover the relevant material (which was discussed on both days).